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Abstract
New quantum private database (with N elements) query protocols are pre-
sented and analyzed. Protocols preserve O(logN) communication complex-
ity of known protocols for the same task, but achieve several significant im-
provements in security, especially concerning user privacy. For example, the
randomized form of our protocol has a cheat-sensitive property - it allows
the user to detect a dishonest database with a nonzero probability, while the
phase-encoded private query protocols [6, 7] for the same task do not have
such a property. Moreover, when the database performs the computational
basis measurement, a particular projective measurement which can cause a
significant loss of user privacy in the previous private query protocols with
O(logN) communication complexity, at most half of the user privacy could
leak to such a database in our protocol, while in the QPQ protocol [5], the
entire user privacy could leak out. In addition, it is proved here that for
large N , the user could detect a cheating via the computational basis mea-
surement, with a probability close to 1
2
using O(√N) special queries. Finally,
it is shown here, for both forms of our protocol, basic and randomized, how
a dishonest database has to act in case it could not learn user’s queries.
∗yufangh4@jnu.edu.cn (Fang Yu), issqdw@mail.sysu.edu.cn (Daowen Qiu)
Preprint submitted to Theoretical Computer Science May 28, 2020
Keywords: Private Database Query Protocol, O(logN) Communication
Complexity, Cheat-sensitivity, Rhetoric Query, Dishonest Database, Privacy
1. Introduction
The symmetrical private information retrieval (SPIR) problem [1, 2] is
usually modeled by a user querying a database A, actually one of its N items,
say Aj (what is usually a bit and j ∈ [N ]), while keeping private not only
the value of j (so-called user privacy), but also all other items Ak(k 6= j)
(so-called data privacy). This is one of the fundamental problems in the
area of secure multiparty computation and communication. In the classical
world, solutions to this problem rely on unproven computational hardness
assumptions from the complexity theory, in order to guarantee privacy of
both parties involved [1]. Actually, no perfect solution to this problem seems
to be known even in the quantum world [3, 4].
On the other hand, for this fundamental problem, significant advantages
in communication efficiency can be obtained using quantum resources. Only
O(logN) of data is needed to be exchanged in some of the known protocols [5,
6, 7], which allows an exponential reduction in the communication complexity
when comparing with the best classical SPIR protocols proposed so far [1,
8, 9]. While these protocols can achieve their querying goals with the lowest
possible level of communication complexity (considering that j has a coding
of logN length), that is with O(logN) communication complexity, these
protocols are secure only when the parties are honest [10]. A dishonest
database may acquire a significant amount of information about queries, via
easy-to-implement such an operation as a single-qubit computational basis
measurement (with two basis states |0〉 and |1〉). Therefore, any improvement
on security of such protocols, especially concerning the user privacy, is an
interesting and important challenge.
The QPQ protocol [5] has been the first private query protocol with
O(logN) communication complexity. It uses a qRAM algorithm [11] to pro-
vide answers to queries. The other two private query protocols with O(logN)
communication complexity, namely [6, 7], complete the query task via a
method which encodes item’s values in the phase of the transmitted state.
This encoding is performed either by an oracle [6], which is assumed to be
able to recognize solutions to the search problem, or by a unitary operator
the form of which is given explicitly [7].
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All three protocols [5, 6, 7] rely on setting a unique, so-called rhetoric,
query 1 to secure the true query j. The way is to let the user always prepare
his/her queries by coherently mixing the true query j with the rhetoric query.
Due to such a superposition the database can not learn j immediately but
needs to perform some cheating operations on the state in order to obtain
information. However, the operations can cause deviation on the state and
thus could be detected by the user after he/she received the state returned
from the database. In terms of this approach, the QPQ protocol [5] can ob-
tain a cheat-sensitive property, i.e. the user can have a non-zero probability
to detect dishonesty of the database. (Cheat sensitive cryptographic proto-
cols between mistrustful parties, are in literature [12] defined as protocols
which guarantee that, when either of them cheats, the other has a nonzero
probability to detect such a cheating.) In addition, setting a rhetoric query
with a standard answer can guarantee the success of the query (by getting
the correct Aj value) not only in the QPQ protocol [5], but also in phase-
encoded private query protocols [6, 7]. Therefore, such a setting is essential
for both protocols.
Both protocols have significant deficiencies concerning security, even in
the case of an attack via a simple computational basis measurement. The
QPQ protocol will inevitably leak j to a dishonest database performing such
an attack, despite of the fact that it would be cheat-sensitive. In contrast, the
phase-encoded private query protocols [6, 7] could leak at most half amount
of the user privacy to such a database, but they are not cheat-sensitive. That
means that such a database can prevent exposure to detections, even if the
attack results in a significant information leakage. Such an attack can even
ruin the protocol because it can lead to an unsuccessful query (by returning
only a random answer). Papers [6, 7] propose variants of the above protocols
that aim to enhance security. However, none of them can deal successfully
with such easy-to-implement attacks.
In this paper, we propose a new scheme for private query protocols which
is also of O(logN) communication complexity. In this scheme, the database
retrieves requested items using a special data retrieving algorithm that is
running locally at the side of the database, for example, the qRAM algo-
1In [5], the query 0 is chosen to be rhetoric if it has a known standard answer A0, say
0. In our protocols, there is no need for a rhetoric query to have such a standard answer.
That is to say, any query different from the true query j can serve as a rhetoric query.
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rithm used in the QPQ protocol [5], and the user extracts the target item
using a method which is developed from one that was used in the phase-
encoded private query protocols [6, 7]. This method allows the user to make
a superposition of the true query with several rhetoric queries, without hav-
ing answers to these rhetoric queries known to the user beforehand. Despite
lacking a preliminary knowledge about answers to rhetoric queries (or even
rhetoric queries themselves in a randomized variant of the protocol), the user
can still get the correct answer to his/her real query.
A use of multiple rhetoric queries can enhance security concerning user
privacy in private query protocols. In the basic form of the proposed protocol,
all queries but j can be rhetoric queries, which is an assumption known to
the database. This form of our new protocol is not cheat-sensitive, but can
be easily modified to a variant which has a cheat-sensitive property. In such
a variant, the user is allowed to select rhetoric queries randomly. This makes
it difficult for the database to conceal its cheating activities due to the lack of
knowledge about rhetoric queries and hence enhance security in preserving
user privacy in a phase-encoded private query protocol. In addition, the
setting of multiple rhetoric queries may lead to a much smaller amount of
information leakage about the query in private query protocols that use a
special data retrieving algorithm to provide answers to queries. Therefore,
the proposed schemes can be regarded as generalizations of known private
query protocols with O(logN) communication complexity in the sense that
they not only maintain their advantages in communication complexity, but
also achieve an improvement in security, especially in preserving user privacy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 starts with a
brief review of related papers. A detailed description of the basic form of
our protocol, as well as an illustration of the protocol actions by a figure is
given in this section. In Section 3, the security of our new protocol is ana-
lyzed. After that, a variant of our new protocol is presented in Section 4 in
which the number of rhetoric queries is introduced as a variable. Security
improvements are then analyzed with respect to that variable. In particu-
lar, the case of an easy-to-implement, but destructive, computational basis
measurement through which the database steals user privacy is addressed in
details. Conclusions are given in Section 5.
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2. Related Papers and New Protocol
2.1. Related Papers
In the QPQ protocol [5], the user prepares at the beginning two states
|j〉 and 1√
2
(|j〉 + |0〉), where {|i〉, i ∈ [N ]} is the computational basis of
the quantum space the user works within. The user then sends randomly
one of the two states to the database and waits for a response from the
database before sending the next one. The database runs the qRAM algo-
rithm [11], with two prepared states, returning as the output states |j〉|Aj〉
and 1√
2
(|j〉|Aj〉 + |0〉|A0〉), respectively. The user gets Aj by measuring the
state |j〉|Aj〉 in the computational basis and then uses Aj with the standard
value of A0 to construct a measurement to test whether the second state is
in the expected form 1√
2
(|j〉|Aj〉+ |0〉|A0〉).
In one of the phase-encoded private query protocols from [6], the user
prepares initially the state 1√
2
(|j〉 + |0〉). The database is then expected to
return the state 1√
2
(
(−1)Aj |j〉+ (−1)A0|0〉), with the answer being encoded
in the phase of the query element. The encoding process is realized by an
oracle, which is assumed to be able to recognize the correct solutions for the
search problem. The user then can get the value of Aj⊕A0 by discriminating
1√
2
(±|j〉 + |0〉), and can then figure out the value of Aj with respect to the
standard A0. The entangled state
1√
2
(|j, 0〉+|0, j〉) is actually used to enhance
security in the other phase-encoded private query protocol [7].
From the above descriptions we can see that in both protocols, only one
rhetoric query, namely “0”, is used. It masks the true query j so that the
private j is unlikely to leak to an honest database and can only be learned
by a dishonest database in a non-deterministic manner. The fact that the
rhetoric query 0 has a standard answer A0 guarantees not only a successful
query (by extracting the correct answer Aj to the query j) in the phase-
encoded private query protocols, but also the cheat-sensitivity of the QPQ
protocol.
However, it is important to observe that using a rhetoric query known to
the database may cause serious security problem in the above private query
protocols withO(logN) communication complexity. Indeed, when measuring
the received state in the computational basis, the database can learn j (in
case of a nonzero outcome) with high probability, which is 1 in the case of
the QPQ protocol and 1/2 for the phase-encoded private query protocols.
Moreover, in the phase-encoded private query protocols, the database can
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conceal itself easily by merely sending back the measurement outcome states
|j〉 or |0〉, because no unexpected outcome could be measured later by the
user. This suggests that the database can make a large gain at a low cost in
the known protocols by means of such an action.
In terms of the data privacy preservation, the phase-encoded private query
protocols exhibit better performance than the QPQ protocol. A dishonest
user can learn at most 1 bit of information from the database in the phase-
encoded private query protocols whilst in the QPQ protocol, by making use
of one extra round of the communication designed specifically for the honesty
detection, user can obtain one additional bit.
2.2. Our New Protocol - Basic Form
The user starts the protocol by preparing the state |ψ0〉 = 1√2
(
|j〉+ 1√
N−1
∑
j′ 6=j |j′〉
)
and then sends it to the database. In order to store answers to queries, the
database prepares an answering qubit initially in the state |0〉. After receiv-
ing the state |ψ0〉, the database applies the special data retrieving algorithm
to convert |ψ0〉|0〉 into
|Ψ1〉 = 1√2
(
|j〉|Aj〉+ 1√N−1
∑
j′ 6=j |j′〉|Aj′〉
)
.
As the next step, the database sends the state |Ψ1〉 back to the user, who then
applies on it the controlled addition modulo 2 operation ∧⊕ with one ancillary
qubit being initially in the state |q〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉−|1〉). The corresponding action
of the operation is
|j〉|Aj〉|q〉 → |j〉|Aj〉|q ⊕Aj〉, |j′〉|Aj′〉|q〉 → |j′〉|Aj′〉|q〉,
i.e. |q〉 is flipped when control qubits are in the state |j〉|1〉, and remains
unchanged otherwise. Afterwards the state |Ψ1〉|q〉 evolves into the state
∧ ⊕ (|Ψ1〉|q〉) = 1√
2

|j〉|Aj〉|q ⊕Aj〉+ 1√
N − 1
∑
j′ 6=j
|j′〉|Aj′〉|q〉


=
1√
2

(−1)Aj |j〉|Aj〉+ 1√
N − 1
∑
j′ 6=j
|j′〉|Aj′〉

⊗ |q〉 = |Ψ2〉|q〉.
As the next step, the user keeps the state |q〉 and sends |Ψ2〉 back to the
database, which reverses the state of the answering qubit into the state |0〉
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Figure 1: The protocol. ( ⊕ˆ is the control addition modulo 2 operator.)
by querying the data retrieving algorithm again. Then the state |Ψ2〉 evolves
into the state
|Ψ3〉 = 1√
2

(−1)Aj |j〉 + 1√
N − 1
∑
j′ 6=j
|j′〉

 ⊗ |0〉 = |ψ3〉|0〉,
For convenience, we denote 1√
2
(|j〉+ 1√
N−1
∑
j′ 6=j |j′〉) by |ψ+3 〉 and 1√2(−|j〉+
1√
N−1
∑
j′ 6=j |j′〉) by |ψ−3 〉, corresponding to the 0 or 1 value of Aj , respec-
tively. Note also that the states |ψ±3 〉 are orthogonal. Therefore, the user
can perform a discriminating measurement after receiving a state from the
database, which keeps the answering qubit, and then interprets that

Aj = 0, if |ψ+3 〉 is measured,
Aj = 1, if |ψ−3 〉 is measured,
the database is cheating, if neither of |ψ±3 〉 is measured.
(1)
The whole procedure is briefly illustrated in Fig.1.
In the above protocol, two rounds of communications are needed to get
an answer to a single query. During such communications, logN qubits,
which store queries, are transmitted four times. In addition, 1 qubit for
storing answers to queries is transmitted twice. In total, 4 logN + 2 qubits
need to be transmitted, i.e. the communication complexity of the protocol is
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asymptotically O(logN), which is an exponential reduction comparing with
the classical and quantum private query protocols known so far. Note that
the data retrieving algorithm runs simply locally at the side of the database.
Therefore, its time cost has no contribution for the computational complexity.
In the protocol, all item’s indexes, except j, are used as rhetoric queries to
create the initial superposed state. From the above procedure we can see that
the user will obtain the correct answer Aj to his/her query j deterministically,
without having to know answers to rhetoric queries beforehand. Moreover,
the setting of the multiple rhetoric queries provides better security, especially
a better user privacy, than previously mentioned protocols. Security of the
protocol, with respect to such a setting, is considered in the following two
sections.
3. Security Issues
Similarly to all already known communication-efficient private query pro-
tocols, our new protocol is secure with respect to honest parties. Indeed, on
one side, data privacy can be seen as being preserved because there is only
one database item retrieved by a user that follows protocol steps. On the
other side, due to the masking effect of rhetoric queries an honest database
can not learn the true query j from the received superposed states. There-
fore, the user privacy is preserved when honest adversaries communicate.
However, a dishonest adversary can have a chance to acquire some informa-
tion that is prohibited to be leaked out. In the following paragraphs, we are
going to discuss some possible attacks from the adversaries, especially from
the database, that could affect security of the protocol.
Data Privacy As already discussed above, our protocol performs two
rounds of communications to accomplish the querying task. However, a dis-
honest user can retrieve at most one item. This is guaranteed by the fact that
only one (answering) qubit contains information on the item values and is
transmitted exactly once during the protocol. Indeed, by the Holevo bound
[13], at most one bit of classical information can be retrieved from one qubit,
in general. Therefore, the user will get exactly Aj if he/she follows the pro-
tocol honestly. A dishonest user, however, may get information about other
items but, no more than one bit of information on the data items in total. In
comparison, with one extra round of communication designed specifically for
the honesty detection, the QPQ protocol could leak at most two items/bits
to a dishonest user.
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If some small probability of error is accepted, a dishonest user may try
to get some information about more data items. Indeed, using a special
quantum interrogation procedure from [14], Theorem 4 presented in the Ap-
pendix A demonstrates that, given the initial state |ψ0〉, it is possible to
get some nontrivial information about N/2 items of the database in total.
The same amount of information can be obtained when random guesses are
used. Therefore, data privacy is well preserved in our protocol. It is worth
to observe that no similar claims were given so far either when analyzing
the QPQ protocol [5] or the phase-encoded private query protocols [6, 7].
In the Appendix A, we show that given the initial state 1√
2
(|0〉 + |j〉) that
was used both in the QPQ protocol [5], and in one phase-encoded private
query protocol [6], an extra half of a bit of information on the database can
be estimated, regardless of those obtained from a random guess, using the
quantum interrogation procedure [14].
User Privacy In any attempt to extract information about j, which is
the user privacy, the database may try to distinguish different choices of j
among all possible forms of the initial state |ψ0〉. However, it can not obtain
much information via this approach because there are N potential states with
a mutual overlap 1/
√
N − 1+(N−2)/2(N−1) 2 that is close to 1/2 for large
N . A better approach for a dishonest database to learn the query is to apply
a measurement directly on the received state, say, using the computational
basis measurement ({|i〉〈i|, i ∈ [N ]}). This approach is easy-to-implement
and may lead to a significant loss of information about the user privacy. The
loss may be even logN bits in the QPQ protocol case and half of logN bits
in the phase-encoded private query protocols cases. To make it even worse,
the database in the phase-encoded private query protocols can conceal itself
easily by merely sending back the outcome states |j〉 or |0〉.
As far as our new protocol is concerned, using the same approach to mea-
sure the received state in the computational basis, the cheating database may
have outcomes distributed from 1 to N , each with probability 1/
√
2(N − 1),
except for j - in this case the probability is one-half. Due to the lack of
knowledge about which index is the true query j and which indexes are serv-
ing as rhetoric queries, the database can no longer simply identify a nonzero
2For any two different choices of such potential states, for example, |ϕi0〉 =
1√
2
(
|ji〉+ 1√N−1
∑
j′
i
6=ji |j′1〉
)
, where i = 1, 2, their overlap is defined to be 〈ϕ1
0
|ϕ2
0
〉 =
1/
√
N − 1 + (N − 2)/2(N − 1).
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outcome (corresponding to an item index) as the true query j, even if j has
been measured. However, the database can make use of the second round of
communication to tell whether or not it has indeed measured j. We explain
the method as follows. Suppose that it has a measurement outcome k at
the first round of communication, the database can then use this k and any
index l (different from k) to produce a fake state
|k〉|1〉+ |l〉|0〉√
2
,
and returns it to the user. Consequently, if the user keeps to follow the
agreed steps, the user will return the state 1√
2
(−|k〉|1〉+ |l〉|0〉) if k = j, and
1√
2
(|k〉|1〉+ |l〉|0〉) otherwise. These two states are orthogonal and therefore
the database can perform a discriminating measurement on the received state
to determine whether or not k = j. Using such a strategy, the database can
get 1
2
logN bits of information on j during the protocol execution. Note that
the information that the database has obtained on j is 1
2
logN bits before
and remains the same after the discriminating measurement is applied. What
the database can gain via such a discriminating measurement is actually a
bit of information on whether or not k = j.
The question is now, which state ought to be returned at the second
round of communication in order to conceal the cheat? The database would
most probably choose to return those states which can conceal its cheat suc-
cessfully in any circumstance. Such a state, in the phase-encoded private
query protocols [6, 7], is the measurement outcome state (|j〉 or |0〉). In
the basic form of our proposed protocol, it is the uniform state 1√
N
∑N−1
i=0 |i〉
because such a state will not result in unexpected outcomes in user’s mea-
surement, i.e. when the user applies his/her measurement on such a state, the
measurement outcome state can only be either |ψ+3 〉 or |ψ−3 〉. (We have that
1−|〈ϕ|ψ+3 〉|2−|〈ϕ|ψ−3 〉|2 equals 0, by replacing into it both |ϕ〉 = 1√N
∑N−1
i=0 |i〉
and |ψ±3 〉 = 1√2(±|j〉 + 1√N−1
∑
j′ 6=j |j′〉).) Since it can be created indepen-
dently of the measurement outcomes of the database, the uniform state can,
and only it can 3 help the database to evade the user’s detection perfectly
in the basic form of our proposed protocol. Furthermore, returning such
a fake state will result in a nearly random answer being extracted by the
3The proof is omitted here. It can be done using ideas contained in the proof of
Theorem 1.
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Table 1: Security analysis results of the proposed protocol in comparison with private
query protocols of O(logN) communication complexity.
Data Privacy
(Leakage of A)
User Privacy
Deterministic
Nondeterministic
(via QIP)
Cheat-
sensitive
b
QPQ prot. 2 bits 1/2 bit yes logN bits
Phase-enc. prot. 1 bit 1/2 bit or not available no 1
2
logN bits
Our new prot. 1 bit 0 bit noa 1
2
logN bits
a But it can be extended to a randomized form which is cheat-sensitive.
b Maximum Leakage of j when cheating via a computational basis measurement.
user, as that by returning the measurement outcome state (|j〉 or |0〉) in the
phase-encoded private query protocols.
Security analysis results of our new protocol, as well as its comparison
with both the QPQ protocol and the phase-encoded private query protocols
discussed above, are summarized in the Table 1. Data presented in that
table show the difference between the known communication-efficient private
query protocols and our protocol concerning preservation of data privacy,
user privacy and the cheat-sensitivity. Data in the column 2 in Table 1 tell
that a dishonest database can learn deterministically at most one item in
both protocols - ours and the phase-encoded private query protocols, and
two items in the QPQ protocol. Data in the column 3 implies that given
the initial state |ψ0〉 in our protocol, a dishonest database can estimate,
even if a small probability of an error is allowed, no more items than those
obtained from a random guess. Such an analysis has been given neither
for the QPQ protocol nor for the phase-encoded private query protocols.
However, a proof sketch, given in the Appendix A below, indicates that an
extra half of a bit of information can be estimated by a dishonest user both in
the QPQ protocol and in one of the phase-encoded private query protocols
using quantum interrogation procedure, regardless of those bits obtained
from a random guess.
Data in the column 4 of the table show that the QPQ protocol is cheat-
sensitive while both phase-encoded private query protocols and the basic
form of our protocol are not. But our protocol is extendable to be cheat-
sensitive. We will present and explore one randomized form of our protocol
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in the next section along with a theorem showing its cheat-sensitivity. We
have compared possible maximum leakages of user privacy among protocols
in the column 5 in Table 1 when the database performs a computational
basis measurement. There one can see that 1
2
logN bits of information on j
could leak out in both protocols, ours and the phase-encoded private query
protocols. In the QPQ protocol, the entire logN bits of information on j
would leak out inevitably.
4. Randomization of Our New Protocol
Let us now consider the case that the user randomly selected t (1 ≤ t ≤
N − 1) rhetoric queries different from the true query j, which constitute a
rhetoric query set T , and use them to prepare the initial state, i.e. |ψ′0〉 =
1√
2
(
|j〉+
∑
j′∈T |j′〉√
t
)
. As in the basic form of our protocol presented above, the
new (randomized) protocol proceeds with the state |ψ′0〉 to return the correct
answer to the user 4. However, the database can no longer evade detection
by simply returning the uniform state 1√
N
∑N−1
i=0 |i〉 because that would make
it to be detected with a probability 1 − |〈ϕ|ψ′+3 〉|2 − |〈ϕ|ψ
′−
3 〉|2, which, by
replacing into it both |ϕ〉 = 1√
N
∑N−1
i=0 |i〉 and |ψ
′±
3 〉 = 1√2
(∑
j′∈T |j′〉√
t
± |j〉
)
,
equals 1 − t+1
N
. Unless t = N − 1, such a probability is nonzero. Now it
is quite natural to ask whether there is any other state that can help the
database to conceal its cheat in any circumstance in this randomized form
of our protocol? If no such state can be found, then, we would say that the
protocol is cheat-sensitive, because whichever state the database chooses to
return, the user would have a non-zero probability to detect the cheat.
In our randomized protocol, the database is assumed to perform an arbi-
trary projective measurement on |ψ′0〉 at the first round of communications.
Through performing such measurements on |ψ′0〉 database can gain some in-
formation on user privacy, j, and can then, in the next step, create a fake
state and return it to the user in order to explore how much information
it has actually obtained on j. At the second round of communication, the
database creates another fake state and return it to the user for the purpose
of concealing the cheat.
4One of the two states |ψ′±
3
〉 = 1√
2
(∑
j′∈T
|j′〉√
t
± |j〉
)
is then supposed to be returned
to the user.
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Now, we can prove the cheat-sensitivity of our protocol.
Theorem 1. The randomized form of our new protocol is cheat-sensitive.
Proof. Suppose that the database has performed a projective measure-
ment on the state |ψ′0〉 at the first round of communication for the purpose of
stealing information and has returned a fake state |ϕ〉 at the second round of
communication for the purpose of concealing the cheat. In order to derive a
cheat-sensitive property for the randomized form of our protocol, regardless
of the measurement basis being used by the database at the first round, |ϕ〉
is assumed to be with a general form
∑N−1
i=0 αi|i〉 (
∑N−1
i=0 |αi|2 = 1). The
user can then apply a discriminating measurement (with two basis states
|ψ′±3 〉) on |ϕ〉. Probabilities of user’s outcomes are p+ = |〈ϕ|ψ
′+
3 〉|2 for |ψ
′+
3 〉,
p− = |〈ϕ|ψ′−3 〉|2 for |ψ
′−
3 〉, and p = 1 − p+ − p− for neither of |ψ
′±
3 〉, respec-
tively. Then, the probability that the database is detected as cheating can
be calculated as
p = 1− | 1√
2t
∑
j′∈T
αj′ +
1√
2
αj |2 − | 1√
2t
∑
j′∈T
αj′ − 1√
2
αj |2
= 1− 1
t
|
∑
j′∈T
αj′ |2 − |αj |2
≥ 1−
∑
j′∈T
|αj′ |2 − |αj |2 (2)
≥ 1−
N−1∑
i=0
|αi|2 = 0 (3)
The inequality (2) has been derived using the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality
5 and the equality holds if and only if all αj′ (j
′ ∈ T ) are equal. That
equality in (3) requires that all αi (i 6= j, j′) have a zero value, which means
that if it is not a special case in the basic form of our protocol that t =
N − 1, the database must know precisely both the true query j and rhetoric
queries j′ in T for every query in order to create a fake state satisfying the
equality in (3). Otherwise, the database would be detected as cheating with
5The Cauchy-Schwarz inequality states that for complex numbers α1, · · · , αn,
β1, · · · , βn, |α1β¯1 + · · · + αnβ¯n|2 ≤ (|α1|2 + · · · + |αn|2)(|β1|2 + · · · + |βn|2) (where the
bar notation is used for complex conjugation). By setting βi =
1√
n
(1 ≤ i ≤ n) we obtain
that 1
n
|α1 + · · ·+ αn|2 ≤ |α1|2 + · · ·+ |αn|2.
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a nonzero probability. However, that is impossible because a real query is
encoded as a superposed state which is made from both the true query j and
a randomly selected nonempty set T of rhetoric queries, and the database can
never learn full knowledge on such a state simply through applying projective
measurements on it. .
Actually, due to the lack of knowledge about both j and T , the database
can hardly recover the initial state |ψ′0〉, after performing projective measure-
ments on it. In particular, assuming that the database has obtained k as an
outcome of a computational basis measurement, the probability of recovering
|ψ′0〉 correctly is:
q = qk=j × 1∑N−1
t=1
(
N−1
t
) + qk 6=j × 11
N−1 ×
∑N−1
t=1
(
N−2
t−1
)
=
1
2 · (2N−1 − 1) +
1
(N − 1) · 2N−1 ,
where qk=j and qk 6=j are probabilities that the database has measured or has
not measured j, respectively. Both of them equal to 1
2
. It is now easy to see
that q is close to 0 for large N.
As the next, it is natural to ask, which state is useful for the database to
conceal its cheat, i.e. without knowing T , which state ought to be returned
by the database to minimize the probability of its cheating being detected?
For the sake of simplicity of our discussions, we consider only the case of the
computational basis measurement. To deal with this question we have the
following theorem.
Theorem 2. Let |ψ′0〉 = 1√2
(
|j〉+
∑
j′∈T |j′〉√
t
)
(1 ≤ t ≤ N − 1) be the initial
state of our new protocol without T being known to the database. Suppose
that a dishonest database has performed a computational basis measurement
and has obtained j. Then the database will return the state |j〉. Suppose that
it has obtained a k different from j, the database would most probably return
the fake state |ϕ〉 = 2√
N+3
|k〉+∑k′ 6=k 1√N+3 |k′〉.
Proof. Firstly, it is safe for the database, if j has been obtained by a
computational basis measurement, to return the measurement outcome state
|j〉 in order to conceal its cheat. The probability that the database is detected
cheating is 0 in such a case. Secondly, in case that j has not been obtained
by a computational basis measurement, but some other k, what the database
can do to minimize the probability of being detected in user’s measurement
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is, according to the inequality (2), to create a fake state |ϕ〉 of the form
a|k〉+∑k′ 6=k b|k′〉, where, without loss of generality, a and b are real numbers
satisfying the equality a2 + (N − 1)b2 = 1. Then, for each t, a, and b, the
probability of the database being detected is
pt,a,b = 1− (a+ b(t− 1))
2
t
− b2
= 1− 2ab+ b2 − b2t− a
2 + b2 − 2ab
t
. (4)
Then, the expected values of pt,a,b for all t is p¯a,b =
∑N−1
t=1
(
N−1
t
)·pt,a,b/(2N−1−
1), where 2N−1 − 1 is the number of candidate initial states. Using the
equalities
∑N−1
t=1 t ·
(
N−1
t
)
= (N − 1)× 2N−2 and∑N−1t=1 (N−1t ) = 2N−1− 1, we
get that
p¯a,b ≈ 1− 2ab− N − 3
2
· b2 − a
2 + b2 − 2ab
2N−1 − 1 ·
N−1∑
t=1
(
N − 1
t
)
1
t
.
Using one equality from [15], we have for N ≥ 2,∑N−1t=1 1t ·(N−1t ) ≤∑N−1t=1 2t+1 ·(
N−1
t
)
= 2 · (2N−1
N
− 1), We therefore have for N ≥ 2,
p¯a,b ≥ 1− 2ab− N − 3
2
· b2 − (a2 + b2 − 2ab) · 4
N
.
By using the equality a2+(N−1)b2 = 1, we get p¯a,b = 12+ 12(a−2b)2−b2−(a−
b)2 · 4
N
, which has a minimum value approximately 1
2
− 1
N+3
at a = 2√
N+3
and
b = 1√
N+3
. That means that in case of outcomes different from j, returning
|ϕ〉 = 2√
N+3
|k〉+∑k′ 6=k 1√N+3 |k′〉 can minimize the probability of the database
being revealed to approximately 1
2
. Therefore, the overall probability that
the database has a minimum chance to be detected cheating is approximately
1
2
× 0 + 1
2
× 1
2
= 1
4
. .
The next natural question is: how many rhetoric queries are optimal for
the user to reveal a database cheating via the computational basis measure-
ment, i.e. which value of t will maximize the probability of detecting such a
cheat? We start with the following theorem:
Theorem 3. t =
√
N − 4
π
√
N − 1 is the optimal number of rhetoric queries
for the user to be defended against a cheating via the computational basis
measurement.
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Proof. Suppose that a dishonest database has performed a computa-
tional basis measurement and obtained k as an outcome. Then, in case that
k = j, no matter what the value of t is, the database can return |j〉 at no risk
of being detected as cheating. In other cases, namely when k 6= j, according
to the inequality (2), the database would return a fake state of the form
|ϕ〉 = a|k〉 +∑k′ 6=k b|k′〉 with a2 + (N − 1)b2 = 1 in order to minimize the
probability of being detected in user’s measurement. We rewrite pt,a,b in the
equation (4) to pt,α = 1− cos2 αt − sin
2 α
N−1 (
1
t
−1+ t)− 2 sinα cosα√
N−1 (1− 1t ), by setting
that a = cosα and b = sinα√
N−1 (0 ≤ α ≤ π2 ). Then, the expected values of pt,α
for all α is
p¯t × π
2
=
∫ π
2
0
pt,αdα =
π
2
− (α
2
+
sin 2α
4
)
∣∣π2
0
× 1
t
−(
(
α
2
− sin 2α
4
)
∣∣π2
0
· 1
N − 1 · (
1
t
+ t− 1)
)
− sin
2 α√
N − 1
∣∣π2
0
× (1− 1
t
)
=
(2N − 1)π
4(N − 1) −
1√
N − 1 −
((
Nπ
4(N − 1) −
1√
N − 1
)
· 1
t
+
π
4(N − 1) · t
)
≤ (2N − 1)π
4(N − 1) −
1√
N − 1 −
π
2(N − 1)
√
N − 4
π
√
N − 1. (5)
The equality in (5) holds if and only if t =
√
N − 4
π
√
N − 1. Therefore,√
N − 4
π
√
N − 1 rhetoric queries are the optimal number of rhetoric queries
for the user to reveal such a cheating activity in the randomized variant of
our protocol. .
Corollary 1. The maximum of probability that the user will detect a com-
putational basis measurement cheating activity is pmaxi =
1
2
− 1
π
√
N−1 −
2
√
N− 4
π
√
N−1−1
4(N−1) .
Proof. The user will detect a cheat with a zero probability when the
database has obtained j from a computational basis measurement, and by
Theorem 3, with a maximum of probability p¯ = 1− 2
π
√
N−1 −
2
√
N− 4
π
√
N−1−1
2(N−1)
at t =
√
N − 4
π
√
N − 1 when the database has not obtained j. Therefore,
the maximum of probability that the user will detect a dishonest database
cheating via a computational basis measurement is pmaxi =
1
2
× 0 + 1
2
× p¯ =
1
2
− 1
π
√
N−1 −
2
√
N− 4
π
√
N−1−1
4(N−1) by using
√
N − 4
π
√
N − 1 rhetoric queries. .
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The advantage of using an (flexible) initial state |ψ′0〉 over (the fixed) |ψ0〉
in preserving user privacy comes mainly from those cases that the database
has not obtained j from the measurement. In such cases, the database can
recover the initial state only when guessing correctly both j and all rhetorical
queries.
pmaxi is approximately
1
2
for large N . In the basic form of the protocol,
the database performing projective measurements would evade detection by
returning the uniform state, regardless of the measurement basis being used.
Therefore, the user privacy is significantly enhanced by using randomness on
rhetoric queries in our new protocol.
5. Conclusions
In this paper we have described and analyzed a new quantum private
database query protocol which is a generalization of the known communication-
efficient protocols, namely, the QPQ protocol and the phase-encoded private
query protocols. The proposed protocol has more than one item (index) to
serve as rhetoric queries, with no need for the user to know answers to such
rhetoric queries beforehand in order to guarantee a successful query. The
database answers queries via a special data retrieving algorithm. The user
can retrieve the answer Aj to the query j through an encoding-decoding
process.
By exchanging only O(logN) of data to accomplish a query task, our
new protocol maintains the advantage of the current protocols [5, 6, 7] for
the same task with respect to communication complexity. It also achieves
an improvement in security, especially in a protection of the user privacy.
Comparing with the QPQ protocol [5], in which the entire amount of user
privacy would inevitably leak to a dishonest database performing a compu-
tational basis measurement, at most half amount of user privacy could leak
out with respect to the same attack when our new protocol is used. Compar-
ing with the phase-encoded private query protocols, one randomized form of
our new protocol has been proved cheat-sensitive. A dishonest user would
be able to retrieve at most one item deterministically, which is the same as
in the phase-encoded private query protocols, but one less than in the QPQ
protocol. It is also proved in the Appendix A that even if a small probabil-
ity of an error is allowed, no one can estimate extra item, via the quantum
interrogation procedure, than that can be obtained from a random guess.
A similar evaluation has not been yet provided either for the QPQ protocol
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or for phase-encoded private query protocols. It is shown in Appendix A
that, by using a quantum interrogation procedure, an extra half of a bit of
information on database can be estimated for both protocols, regardless of
those obtained from a random guess.
In the basic form of the proposed protocol, all item indexes but j serve as
rhetoric queries. A dishonest database performing projective measurements
can return a fake uniform state to evade detection, regardless of measure-
ment basis being used. By introducing randomness on rhetoric queries, our
protocol gains a cheat-sensitive property, as demonstrated by Theorem 1. In
the mean while, the user will reveal a database performing a computational
basis measurement with a maximum probability approximately 1
2
by using
O(√N) rhetoric queries for large N , which are demonstrated by Theorem 3
and Corollary 1.
A. Estimation of a Leakage of Data Privacy
The user may estimate a number of database items, if a small probability
of error is allowed, by using a quantum interrogation procedure from Section
4.2 in [14], given the initial state |ψ0〉. Indeed, we can prove the following
theorem:
Theorem 4. Let |ψ0〉 = 1√2
(
|j〉+
∑
j′ 6=j |j′〉√
N−1
)
be the initial state of the above
mentioned quantum interrogation procedure. A user can use this procedure to
estimate no more than N
2
expected number of database items, which is equal
to that obtained using random guesses.
Proof. By attaching an appropriate number of ancillary qubits, the
state |ψ0〉 can be mapped into the state |ψ′0〉 = 1√2(|~xj〉+ 1√N−1
∑
j′ 6=j |~xj′〉),
where ~xi ∈ {0, 1}N has a 1 at the ith position. The proof is based on the
method from the page 11 in [14]. As the first step, using one auxiliary qubit
in the state (|0〉 − |1〉)/√2 attached, a special data retrieving algorithm or
an oracle A maps |ψ′0〉 into the state
A|ψ′0〉 =
1√
2
· (−1)~xj · ~A|~xj〉+ 1√
2(N − 1)
∑
j′ 6=j
(−1)~xj′ · ~A|~xj′〉,
where ~A denotes an unknown database string. By assuming that ~A consists
of zeros only, the initial state |ψ′0〉 will not change after being applied by the
oracle A. Therefore, we have:
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H⊗NA|ψ′0〉 = H⊗N

 1√
2
|~xj〉+ 1√
2(N − 1)
∑
j′ 6=j
|~xj′〉


=
1√
2N
∑
~y

 1√
2
· (−1)~xj ·~y + 1√
2(N − 1)
∑
j′ 6=j
(−1)~xj′ ·~y

 |~y〉
=
1√
2N
∑
~y
(
(−1)yj√
2
+
2t~y −N − (−1)yj√
2(N − 1)
)
|~y〉
=
1√
2N

∑
yj=0
(
1√
2
− N + 1√
2(N − 1) +
√
2t~y√
N − 1
)
|~y〉+
∑
yj=1
(
− 1√
2
−
√
N − 1√
2
+
√
2t~y√
N − 1
)
|~y〉

 ,
where yi and t~y are the ith bit and the number of zeros of the N -bit binary
string ~y, respectively. Let us denote coefficients of those |~y〉 with yj = 0 and
yj = 1 in the above last equation as at~y and bt~y , respectively. They depend
solely on the number of zeros of ~y. The expected number of correct bits of
~A equals therefore the expected number of zeros of the string ~y, which is
#zeros(H⊗NA|ψ′0〉) =
N∑
t=0
(
t ·
(
N − 1
t− 1
)
· a2t + t ·
(
N − 1
t
)
· b2t
)
,
where H denotes the Hadamard operator. Using the following equalities
N∑
t=1
t
(
N−1
t−1
)
= (N + 1) · 2N−2
N−1∑
t=0
t
(
N−1
t
)
= (N − 1) · 2N−2,
N∑
t=1
t2
(
N−1
t−1
)
= N(N + 3) · 2N−3
N−1∑
t=0
t2
(
N−1
t
)
= N(N − 1) · 2N−3,
N∑
t=1
t3
(
N−1
t−1
)
= (N + 1)(N2 + 5N − 2) · 2N−4
N−1∑
t=0
t3
(
N−1
t
)
= (N − 1)2(N + 2) · 2N−4,
a straightforward but cumbersome calculation shows that the quantity is
N/2, which is equal to that obtained from a random guess. .
It is worth to note that with the initial state 1√
2
|0 · · ·0〉+ 1√
2N
∑N−1
i=0 |~xi〉,
about N
2
+
√
N
2
correct bits of ~A can be estimated in total, as shown in the
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Section 4.3 in [14]. As next we show, by a similar proof, for the QPQ protocol
[5] and also for one of the phase-encoded private query protocols [6] that with
the initial state |φ〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉+ |j〉) (for which the transformed initial state is
|φ′〉 = 1√
2
(|~0〉+ |~xj〉) ), the expected number of correct bits of ~A is
#zeros(H⊗NA|φ′〉) = #zeros

 1√
2N
∑
~y
(
1√
2
+
(−1)yj√
2
)
|~y〉


=
1
2N
·
N∑
t=1
(
t ·
(
N − 1
t− 1
)
· (
√
2)2
)
=
N
2
+
1
2
.
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